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CHANGING TIMES FOR CORPORATIONS AND THEIR AUDITORS

The public accounting profession has come under heavy

attack in recent times because of the perceptions of its critics
and the emerging recognition, particularly in Congress, of the
importance of the role of auditors and financial reporting.

The

criticisms of the profession are lending to profound changes,
especially in the role and responsibilities of auditors.

Because

the ultimate objective of these changes is to provide improved

corporate accountability they will have a significant impact on
corporate management as well.

Therefore my remarks are relevant

to the interests of the various groups represented here this
evening.

Understandably, however, I shall be talking mainly

from the viewpoint of the independent auditor.
Toplace the recent developments in perspective let me

give you a brief overview of why the profession has come under
such heavy criticism.

Auditors have traditionally been looked to as a principal
means of providing a reasonable degree of assurance as to the

reliability of financial statements to help protect investors
and credit grantors from being misled by misrepresentations or

frauds.

More recently, however, the function has taken on added

dimensions because government officials have come to realize
that:

1.

Financial statements underlie the financial

data and statistics which are used in the
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formation of national policies, particularly

those relating to the economy and capital

formation.
2.

Independent audits are a vital ingredient in

the scheme of control over the conduct and
accountability of the corporate entity within
our society.

It is understandable, then, that when audited financial

statements prove to have been misleading on the basis of subsequent
events, such as unheralded business failures, questions are raised

as to how this could happen.

Assumptions are made that the

auditors failed to meet their responsibilities either as a result
of deficient performance of their work, or worse, that they knowingly

placed their imprimatur on misleading financial statements.
These perceptions stem in large part from the often

unconscious belief that an auditor’s opinion should be expected
to provide an absolute guarantee that:

1.

The financial statements are reliable without

qualification and that

2.

Any material management frauds have been detected

and disclosed.
Even more extreme is the expectation that the auditor
is representing by his opinion that the judgments and actions

of management have been of high quality and in the best interests
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of all who may rely on the financial statements.

Some also seem

to expect that an auditor’s opinion denotes that investment in
or extensions of credit to the company will be both safe and
profitable.

These exaggerated expectations contribute heavily to
the belief on the part of many critics that the profession is

failing to satisfactorily carry out its mission.

Anything less

than zero defects in financial reporting is viewed by these

individuals as being unsatisfactory.
The profession devoutly shares the desire to reach
such a state of perfection in an imperfect world.

But attain

ment of such an objective is not a realistic expectation.

Among

the principal reasons why this is so are:
1.

Cost/benefit considerations necessarily place
limits on the amount of audit tests that are
performed.

Thus audit tests are applied on a

sample basis rather than to 100% of all trans

actions .
2.

Even if 100% of all transactions are verified
the reliability of financial statements could
not be absolutely guaranteed because they are

based upon guesses about the future such as
collectibility of receivables or the useful
lives of productive facilities.

3.

Management fraud defies detection by due auditing

care when it involves cleverly executed collusion
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between related parties, forgery or trans

actions which are not recorded on the books

or records.

4.

The auditing profession, like all professional

groups, cannot reasonably expect to eliminate
all breakdowns in performance or integrity on
the part of a small percentage of its members.

Because these factors make it impossible for auditors

to provide absolute assurance as to the reliability of financial

statements the question is often asked "what good are audits if

they don’t provide complete protection? ”

The answer, of course,

is that audits do provide a reasonable degree of protection and
do prevent many cases where financial statements would otherwise

be misleading.

The fact that zero defects are not achieved is

not a valid basis for concluding that the auditing function is
necessarily being performed in an unsatisfactory manner.

Even though perfection is not attainable, the profession
has a responsibility to strive constantly to improve the effective

ness of audits to the maximum extent that is reasonably achievable.
Accordingly it is entirely appropriate to ask the question of

whether the profession is satisfactorily meeting that responsibility.

To answer that question, the AICPA appointed a special

commission in 1974 to examine the responsibilities of auditors in
the light of legitimate expectations of the public.

Prior to his
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untimely death, the Commission was chaired by Manuel Cohen, former
Chairman of the SEC.

The Commission was initially composed of

seven members, four drawn from other disciplines and interest
groups and three from the ranks of the auditing profession.
A report on its preliminary conclusions was published
on April 1, 1977.

Based upon responses and public hearings on

its tentative views the Commission has now completed its work

and its final report has just been published.

The report contains

over 40 recommendations for improving the way in which the profes
sion meets its responsibilities.

The conclusions are based in

part upon an extensive body of research into the underlying causes
of the allegations directed at the auditing profession.

Unfortunately

the Commission directed only a limited amount of its attention to
the question of whether public expectations were unreasonable and,

if so, what might be done to solve this problem.
In the meantime, while the Commission was deliberating,
the fast-moving developments within federal government circles

relating to the profession made it necessary for the profession
to respond in its own behalf to the allegations being made about
its performance.

The Metcalf subcommittee staff study of the

profession and the Moss subcommittee report on its oversight of
the SEC raised a number of fundamental questions that required an

immediate and comprehensive response if unwanted legislation was
to be avoided.

In general, it was asserted in these reports that the
performance of auditors is not as good as it should be.

The
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reasons for this judgment were not clearly articulated but
invariably when this judgment is made the number of spectacular

business failures which occurred during the last decade are cited
as evidence.
To a large extent the criticisms are a result of a

loss of confidence in the integrity of business.

The energy

crisis spawned widespread doubts about the reliability of the

financial and statistical reports of the oil and gas industry.
The revelations about illegal political contributions, bribes
and off-book slush funds caused untold damage to the credibility

of corporate management.
It does not follow, of course, that these events were

necessarily accompanied by failures of auditors to meet their
responsibilities.

Nevertheless it is clear that the result has

been a serious erosion in the credibility of the independent
auditors.

This loss of confidence is focused principally on

perceptions that audit failures occur because:
1.

The accounting and auditing standards being set

in the private sector

are deficient in quality,

quantity and timeliness.

Therefore it is sug

gested by some that the setting of these standards

should be transferred to a government agency.
2.

The auditors were negligent and exercised poor

judgment or were not sufficiently independent
of their clients and either knowingly or
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unconsciously protected the interests of manage
ment at the expense of shareholders and other
users of financial statements.

3.

The profession’s technical, independence and due
care standards are not being enforced and CPAs

and CPA firms are not being adequately punished.

Therefore the SEC is urged by the critics to
exercise its enforcement authority more vigorously

and additional forms of governmental regulation

of the profession are alleged to be necessary.
These perceptions are so serious that the profession can
ill afford to ignore them even if they are greatly exaggerated.

I

believe it is safe to say that a great majority of the profession

would vigorously assert that such conclusions are not supported
by the facts.

Unfortunately it is difficult to mount objective

proof that the indictment of the profession’s performance is either
warranted or unwarranted.
In any event, if those who are judging the profession
are convinced that reforms are necessary it is not terribly
effective to tell them their judgments are faulty and to engage

in what has become popularly known as ’’stonewalling”.

The

distinctions between appearances and fact have become so blurred
in our society that it is almost irrelevant as to whether

appearances are distorted.

Thus the profession has taken action

-8-

to effect changes based upon the allegations of its critics even

though I am certain that a great many CPAs are unconvinced of the
validity of the necessity for such reforms.

Because of the perceived deficiencies in the performance

of auditors and the accountability of corporate management there
has been an avalanche of recommendations for reform.

These have

been put forward by congressional committees and their staffs,

the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, the SEC and by CPAs

themselves in their testimony and written submissions to Congress.
Some of the suggested changes were already under consideration by
the AICPA even before they were recommended by others.

Many of the changes, particularly those in response to
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, are aimed at improved

corporate accountability.

Others are intended to bolster the

independence of auditors and establishing an effective system of
regulation of CPA firms.
For purposes of simplification I will discuss the more

important recommendations under four categories:
1.

Accounting and Auditing Standards.

2.

Independence of Auditors and Improved Corporate
Accountability .

3.

Regulation of the Profession.

4.

Relief for Small and/or Closely Held Businesses.

5.

Other Matters.
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Because of time constraints I will discuss only very
briefly each of the items under these classificiations .

I belie
ve

this will be sufficient to convince you that the profession is
indeed undergoing major and far-reaching changes and that many of

the changes will have a significant impact on corporate accountability.

I.

Accounting and Auditing Standards

At various times individual members of Congress have
expressed concern about allowing the private sector to set
accounting standards.

Some have alleged that misleading financial

statements have occurred because the private-sector standard setting
bodies have been unwilling to eliminate accounting alternatives

that were advantageous to corporate interests.
to assert that the auditing

These critics tend

profession has been the captive of its

clients and is not to be entrusted with direct responsibility for
setting the standards.

The suggested cure has been to transfer the standard

setting to a government body.

Some have urged that the SEC exercise

its existing statutory authority by rescinding its policy of looking
to the FASB.

Others have recommended that the GAO or a wholly new

governmental body be given the responsibility to set accounting

standards.
As a result of a vigorous defense of the FASB before
congressional committees it currently appears that the recommendations
for government setting of accounting standards will not prevail.
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This issue has, at least for the time being, cooled down and been

replaced by proposals for additional federal regulation of the
profession.

Nevertheless the present arrangement between the SEC

and the FASB is not entirely secure and its future is inextricably

intertwined with the fate of the profession with respect to
possible federal regulation.

The jurisdiction over the setting of auditing standards
has also become the subject of recommendations for change.

Congressman Moss has suggested that such standards be set either

by the SEC or under a statutory regulatory body for the profession
similar to the National Association of Securities Dealers.

Also

the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities has recommended that
the Institute’s present auditing standards executive committee be

converted into a full-time paid board and suggested other
structural changes, as well.
In response to these recommendations the Institute

appointed a special committee to study the present structure of
AudSEC and recommend what changes, if any, should be considered in
the way auditing standards are established.

The committee is in

the final stages of its study and is expected to report its con

clusions to the AICPA’s Board of Directors this spring.
Retention of the establishment

of both accounting

and auditing standards in the private sector is dependent to a

large extent upon whether the profession is successful in avoiding
legislation to establish an NASD type regulatory system for the
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profession.

If such a statutory regulatory body were to be

established under the oversight of the SEC the odds would be
very high that the functions of both AudSEC and the FASB would

be included under the new regulatory structure.

It is important,

therefore, for members of industry to recognize that they have

a stake in the fate of the profession with respect to federal

regulation.
II.

Independence of Auditors and Improved Corporate Accountability

The concerns of the SEC and Congressional committees

regarding the independence of auditors are based upon the more
fundamental desires to achieve improvements in corporate account
ability.

Therefore any steps to enhance the independence of auditors

are really directed toward both objectives and I shall discuss them

in this content.

Perhaps the most important of the many recommendations
under this subject is the belief that independent audit committees

will be the cure for a great number of perceived deficiencies.

The

role of such committees is to act as a watchdog over the conduct

of management and to serve as a buffer between management and the

independent auditors.
The AICPA’s Board of Directors, at the strong urging of
the SEC, has appointed a special committee to study whether and

how the AICPA could impose a requirement for a public company to
have an audit committee as a condition of expressing an unqualified
audit opinion on the company's financial statements.

The Institute

has agreed to use its best efforts to achieve such an objective
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probably through the establishment of an auditing standard
requiring a disclosure if a company fails to have a prescribed
type of audit committee.

In addition to audit committees a number of other
measures have been suggested by the SEC, the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities and the report of the late Senator
Metcalf’s subcommittee.

The Institute has acted in response to

each of these recommendations and I will mention each of them
very briefly.

1.

The AICPA Board of Directors has endorsed the

concept that auditors review and publicly report

on systems of internal control of SEC companies
as separate engagements but not as a condition
to expressing audit opinions on financial state

ments.

It has directed AudSEC to develop standards

for such engagements.

A special advisory committee

composed principally of industry representatives

is working on the development of criteria for

evaluating systems of internal control.

In the

meantime AudSEC has issued a standard requiring
auditors to report on internal control deficiencies

to boards of directors or audit committees.
2.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the recommendation

that a report by management be included with
financial statements indicating the responsibilities
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being assumed by management.

A special committee

including industry representatives has been

appointed to develop the suggested form and content

of such a report.
3.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the concept of

adoption by management of policy statements on
expected conduct and that auditors should, as
a separate engagement, review and report on
management ’s actions to assure compliance with its

policy statement.

AudSEC has been directed to

develop standards for such reviews and reports and
a special committee has been appointed to develop

a model for policy statements on conduct.
4.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the recommendation

that auditors be engaged, dismissed and make their
fees arrangements with the audit committee or
board of directors of their publicly-held audit

clients.

Implementation of this arrangement will

be studied by the special committee on audit com
mittees .

5.

The AICPA Board has embraced the concept that

auditors should be required to attend the annual

shareholder’s meetings of their publicly-held

-14-

audit clients.

The special committee on audit

committees will also seek ways to implement this
requirement.

6.

The AICPA Board supports the recommendation that
the present information required in 8-K reports,
when there is a change in auditors, should be dis
closed in all audited financial statements of SEC

companies.

However it is opposed to the inclusion

of reasons for the change as currently being pro
posed by the SEC.

The special committee on management

reports will seek ways to implement disclosure in
financial statements of the 8-K information.
7.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA firms has established

a requirement for its members that all disagreements

with SEC audit clients which, if not resolved, would

have resulted in a qualified opinion, be reported
in writing to the client's audit committee or board

of directors.
8.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA Firms has, among
others, adopted the following requirements for its

members:

a.

Proscribed the performance of consulting
engagements involving psychological testing,
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public opinion polls, mergers and acquisitions
for a fee and certain aspects of marketing and
plant layout.

Actuarial services and executive

recruiting are currently being studied to deter
mine the extent to which such services should

be proscribed.
b.

Annual reports to the audit committee or
board of directors of SEC clients on the amount

of consulting fees and descriptions of the
types of consulting services provided during
the year.

c.

Annual reports to the section, for inclusion
in files open to the public, the per cent of

total fees represented by each of consulting,
tax and accounting and auditing services.

d.

Annual reports of the names of all SEC clients

from which the fees exceed 5% of the member’s

total fees.

e.

Mandatory rotation every five years of the
audit partner in charge of the audits of all

SEC clients.

f.

Mandatory concurring reviews of audit reports

-16-

of all SEC clients before issuance of such
reports.

A concurring review is one which is

conducted by a person not otherwise involved
in the audit.
There is little doubt that as all of the foregoing

measures are implemented there will be improvement in both the

independence of auditors and in corporate accountability.

However,

I fear that people in government may have expectations that these
actions will be a great panacea for past deficiencies and that

no future difficulties will be encountered in financial reporting
or corporate conduct.

If this is the case we are destined to

experience another round of investigation, hearings and criticism

at some future date.

Let us hope that the perceptions at that

time will be more realistic and less cynical and the expectations
more reasonable.
III.

Regulation of the Profession

Congressman Moss’s subcommittee recently completed
hearings which focused on the progress of the profession toward

establishing an improved system of self-regulation.

Mr. Moss

has stated publicly on several occasions that if he was not

satisfied

he would introduce legislation to establish a quasi-

governmental body similar to the NASD and under the oversight
of the SEC to regulate the profession.
The Institute’s response has been to establish a division

for CPA firms with two sections, one for SEC Practice and another
for Private Companies Practice.

The two sections are substantially
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parallel except that some of the requirements of the Private

Companies Practice Section are tailored to be more relevant to needs

of non-public companies.
The SEC Practice Section imposes regulatory requirements
on participating firms (in addition to those previously mentioned)
as follows:

a.

Mandatory continuing professional education

of 40 hours a year for all professional staff
members.
b.

A mandatory peer review of the firm at least
every three years and at such other times as may

be imposed as part of a disciplinary action.
Such reviews will include investigation of

whether unreasonable time or fee pressures are

adversely effecting the quality of audits.
c.

Imposition of sanctions on firms found to be
deficient in meeting the quality control standards
of the AICPA.

d.

Annual filing of relevant information about the

firm for inclusion in files open to public inspection.
This will not, however, include financial statements.

e.

Maintenance of minimum amounts of legal liability
insurance as prescribed by the executive committee

of the section.
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The key to the success of this self-regulatory scheme
for CPA firms with SEC practice is the appointment of a Public

Oversight Board to monitor the operations of the section and report

at its discretion any information, findings or views to the SEC,

congressional committees or the public at large.
a.

The Board will:

Consist of five prominent individuals from outside
the profession and having unquestioned reputations

and integrity.
b.

Have access to all files, meetings and activities
of the section.

c.

Have authority

d.

Be compensated from dues charged to member firms.

to hire its own staff as required.

Although membership in the section is voluntary it is
believed that peer, client and public pressures will cause membership
for firms auditing SEC companies to be mandatory for all practical

purposes.
It is too early to know whether the Institute’s program
for self-regulation will function satisfactorily or whether it

will be given a chance to prove itself.

Congressman Moss may

introduce his proposed legislation despite a hearing record that does

not support such action at this time.

Also, the Institute has been

sued by a group of members seeking to force submitting the division
for firms program to a membership referendum.
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Even though the outcome of these challenges is
uncertain I am optimistic that legislation will not be enacted
at this time and that the courts will confirm that a membership

referendum is not required under the Institute’s bylaws.

Given

the opportunity to function I believe that the division for firms

will prove to be an excellent vehicle for effective self-regulation.

IV.

Relief for Small and/or Closely Held Businesses

There is growing awareness within the profession and

in other sectors as well that in setting accounting standards too
little attention has been paid to their relevance when applied to
smaller privately held companies.

It has become increasingly

obvious that standards designed for publicly-held companies do not

always make sense with respect to non-public companies.

Some types

of disclosures are either irrelevant or their costs far exceed any
benefits to the users of financial statements in the particular

circumstances.
The report of the late Senator Metcalf's subcommittee

and the report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
both recognized this problem and urged that it be given greater

attention.

The Institute has been addressing this problem with
increasing urgency over the past three years.

several steps:

It has taken
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1.

A special committee has been working with the

FASB, the SEC and the AICPA Board of Directors
to urge the FASB to limit application of certain

portions of the financial accounting standards

to publicly-traded companies.

The committee

has issued a report containing its recommendations
and the Board of Directors is awaiting the outcome

of current deliberations on this matter by the

FASB.

Preliminary decisions on how to deal with

the problem are expected to be reached this spring.

2.

A previously appointed subcommittee of AudSEC

to deal with the subject of unaudited financial
statements has been upgraded to the status of a
senior committee with the authority to issue its
own standards on accounting and review type engage

ments.

An exposure draft of its first proposed

pronouncement has just been issued.

3.

The Private Companies Practice Section has been
established in part to facilitate tailoring practice
standards to recognize the differences in needs of
smaller privately-held companies.

By institutionalizing

the differences the need for their recognition when

setting standards will be more widely accepted.
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Providing for exceptions in the application of

standards poses a difficult problem of educating users of
financial statements.

In addition, many practitioners have an

uneasy feeling that differential standards based upon size and

ownership of companies will lead to public perceptions that

there are first and second classes of financial statements and

first and second class auditors.

Of course, this condition

already exists to the extent that there are unaudited and audited

classifications.
The public and the profession cannot have it both ways.

Relief from unduly burdensome standards cannot be achieved for
smaller privately-held businesses without adopting exceptions
in the application of the standards required for publicly-traded

I believe the time is overdue to start making such

companies.

exceptions and that we will embark upon this course in the coming
months.

V.

Other Matters
The Institute has a great number of other changes underway

which are in various stages of implementation.

I will simply list

them for you without further explanation.
1.

Meetings of Council and senior committees are now

open to the public.

2.

We are balloting on adding three public members
to the Board of Directors.
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3.

We have reduced big 8 representation on all

senior committees to five or less.

4.

We have removed some of the secrecy from
disciplinary actions.

5.

We are balloting on modification of the rules

on advertising and solicitation, incompatible
occupations and employment of employees of other

CPA firms.

6.

We are embarked on a program to overhaul the

present standard auditor’s report.
7.

Adoption of a separate footnote describing
uncertainties is being urged for adoption by the

FASB.
8.

A continuing committee on searching for and

detecting fraud has been appointed.
9.

We are attempting to develop criteria for
departures from generally accepted accounting

principles when there are unusual circumstances.
Summary and Conclusion
I believe that you will agree that what I have just

described constitutes an impressive and massive response to
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nearly all of the criticisms and recommendations that have

emanated from the two congressional subcommittees and the

Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities.

To be sure, many of

the actions will require a good deal of time to be fully implemented.
But the important thing is that they are all in motion and have

the full support of the Institute’s governing bodies.

Parts of

the program will require the cooperation and action by management
or other entities.

However we are dedicated to using our best

efforts to achieve the objectives that have been adopted.
We hope that the result of all these efforts will be:
1.

Retention by the private sector of the authority

to establish accounting and auditing standards.

2.

Enhancement of the credibility and accountability

of corporations and management.

3.

Enchancement of the quality of work and the

independence of auditors and the credibility of
the profession.

4.

Better regulation not only of individual CPAs but

of CPA firms under a self-regulatory scheme and
avoidance of the imposition by legislation of a
federal regulatory body for the profession.

5.

Greater participation by local practitioners in
the affairs of the profession.
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6.

Establishment of a basis for drawing distinctions
between public and smaller non-public companies
for purposes of applicability of technical standards.

Will we be successful in achieving these results?
one can say for certain, but I sincerely hope so.

No

If we fail, it

will not be because we did not try our best to correct our faults

as perceived by our critics.

Frankly, I know of little else that

we might do except to find a way to become godlike infallible

creatures with powers to perform miracles.
Despite all the problems I remain highly optimistic.

If we have the will, the imagination and the statesmanship we can
all make a great contribution to preserving our free enterprise

system and arresting the trend toward an all pervasive federal
government.

